How to Think and Moral Certainty

In an age of hyper-entertainment, quick media plugs, and “because I feel like it,” the art and science of thinking gets threatened. Lewis has a great little paradigm on how to think with respect to deducing moral certainty:

We have seen that every moral judgment involves facts, intuition, and reasoning, and, if we are wise enough to be humble, it will involve some regard for authority as well. Its strength depends on the strength of these four factors. Thus if I find that the facts on which I am working are clear and little disputed, that the basic intuition is unmistakably an intuition, that the reasoning which connects this intuition with the particular judgment is strong, and that I am in agreement or, at worst, not in disagreement with authority, then I can trust my moral judgment with reasonable confidence. And if, in addition, I find little reason to suppose that any passion has secretly swayed my mind, this confidence is confirmed.

If, on the other hand, I find the facts doubtful, the supposed intuition by no means obvious to all good men, the reasoning weak, and authority against me, then I ought to conclude that I am probably wrong. And if the conclusion which I have reached turns out also to flatter some strong passion of my own, then my suspicion should deepen into moral certainty [I should no longer be certain]. By “moral certainty” I mean that degree of certainty proper to moral decisions; for mathematical certainty is not here to be looked for.

CS Lewis, The Weight of Glory, pp. 71-2.

The question, then, is this: what is our authority of choice?